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The Government Procurement Agreement (GPA)
of the WTO and the Bilateral Procurement
Agreement between Switzerland and the
European Union prohibit the discrimination of
non-local firms.The Swiss legislation interprets the
international obligations in a great variety of ways.
This causes uncertainty and high transaction costs
both for suppliers and purchasing agencies.
Moreover, it gives way for rent-seeking by local
firms to the detriment of the local tax payers and
foreign firms.
In this article, we shall analyse the Swiss public
procurement policy under two aspects: welfare
economics and public choice. We want to examine
whether a federal law should regulate or har-
monise the public procurement procedure in order
to ensure efficiency and fairness. Our analysis is
purely economic. Legal aspects, though very
important, are neglected (see Biaggini 2003a and
2003b, Zufferey and Dubey 2003).
In Switzerland,the total amount of public procure-
ment is approximately 25 percent of total public
expenditure and 8 percent of GDP. Before the
GPA and the Bilateral Agreement became effec-
tive (in 1996 and 2002 respectively) public pro-
curement was considered as an instrument of eco-
nomic promotion. The local, cantonal or national
firms were privileged for two reasons:because they
create jobs and because they pay taxes. This has
changed.Foreign suppliers may not be discriminat-
ed any longer. The rationale behind this reform is:
intensification of competition, efficiency gains
through division of labour and economies of scale,
and stronger incentives for innovation. This
requires a harmonisation of the procurement rules.
The international procurement agreements give
the different countries a certain scope when imple-
menting them. Today, in Switzerland there are
27 different procurement laws, one of the Federal
Government and 26 of the cantons.The differences
regard the threshold values, the award procedures,
the selection and evaluation process, the contract
conclusion,the terms and conditions of appeal,and
the legal protection.
Welfare Analysis
The main prerequisites for efficiency are: competi-
tion, free market entry, low transaction costs, incen-
tives to use economies of scale and to implement
innovations. Besides these efficiency conditions in
the narrow sense some further aspects have to be
taken into account,especially job security,security of
supply, social equity, and political acceptance.
Competition and free market entry
Efficient markets require competition, and compe-
tition requires free market entry, otherwise scarce
resources are wasted, rents are transferred from
the consumers to the producers, and innovations
are hindered. Whether in reality these disadvan-
tages occur depends on the degree of competition.
If a monopoly or cartel exists it must be careful not
to attract new suppliers because of high profits
(Baumol et al. 1982). Firms prefer to establish or
defend a cartelistic situation by bringing govern-
ment in to protect it.The easiest way to do so is to
restrict market entrance for outside competitors by
legal measures. In order not to damage their image
cartels and the politicians protecting them try to
conceal their interests by using good-sounding and
already accepted goals such as job security, social
and regional equity.
Low transaction costs
The lower the level of information about goods to
be provided and firms able to supply them the
higher the transaction costs. In the field of public
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The present paper summarises a report on public procurement in
Switzerland written for the Federal Government and the Swiss can-
tons (Frey, Kilchenmann and Krautter 2003 and 2004).procurement the large variety of rules among can-
tonal and local jurisdictions leads to legal uncer-
tainty and high transaction costs, not only for the
potential suppliers but also for the procurement
agencies.
Fully open procurement procedures may raise
transaction costs, too. This especially holds for
small quantities to be bought.The costs of an open
tender can easily exceed its benefits. It is therefore
sensible to restrict the international procurement
rules to purchases above a certain sum. This limit
depends on the kind of goods to be procured (com-
modity, investment, services, etc.).
With electronic procurement (E-procurement) via
Internet transaction costs can be lowered.1 The
online set-up of the complete supply chain should
additionally lower the costs (see below).Hence the
following conclusion can be drawn:Orders exceed-
ing a certain amount should be subject to a gener-
al regulation.Rules trying to satisfy each particular
case are not desirable, however. They increase the
transaction costs.
Economies of scale
For many goods and services average costs
decrease with increasing quantities. In the public
sector, production within locally and regionally
limited boundaries does not allow the firms to ben-
efit from mass production.When firms are allowed
to offer not only in their own jurisdiction costs will
be lower.
E-procurement as an innovation
Market rules should be formulated in a way that the
firms are permanently forced to search for new and
better solutions. The chance that
this will be the case increases
with the number of competitors.
An innovation that will revolu-
tionise government procurement
is E-procurement. According to
the Commission of the Euro-
pean Union 25 percent of all
submissions could be treated electronically (Bovis
2001). This means that the entire procurement
chain should be processed electronically: the clari-
fication of the demand by the administration
departments who plan to place orders with the pro-
curement agency, the call for bids, the positioning
of the tender offers, the process of tendering, the
composition of the contracts, the contracting, the
delivery of the goods and services, the invoicing,
the payment,the inventory,and the statistical com-
putation and evaluation. In order to realise effi-
ciency gains from E-procurement, rules and proce-
dures must be harmonised. The local autonomy of
the decision makers is not restricted by such a form
of technical rationalisation.
The advantages of E-procurement for the different
partners is summarised in the following table.
Other goals
In the field of public procurement the advocates of
locally and regionally limited submission practices
sometimes argue that privileging domestic firms is
associated with positive pecuniary externalities.As
known from welfare economics externalities of this
type do not lead to market failure and cannot jus-
tify government intervention (Scitovsky 1954).
Much more, other goals are addressed as well, such
as job security (full employment),the promotion of
the local and regional firms (economic growth),the
promotion of education and R&D (innovation),
equal provision of public services to all groups and
regions, social equity, or environmental protection.
At first sight, these arguments seem to be convinc-
ing.They involve the danger of high efficiency and
growth losses, however. As will be shown in the
next section, they often open the floodgates to
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Bundling of demand in
view of lower prices
Easier detection of
protectionist practices
Source: Bovis 2001, with own additional arguments.
1 In Switzerland an E-procurement plat-
form already exists (SIMAP,Système d’in-
formation sur les marchés publics en
Suisse, www.simap.ch). It can be used by
federal, cantonal and local public agencies
as well as public enterprises.CESifo DICE Report 3/2004 33
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rent-seeking. The taxpayers have to bear higher
charges, whereas the local suppliers benefit from
higher sales and profits. In most cases it would be
much cheaper to directly subsidise local firms for
contributing to one of the public concerns men-
tioned. Government procurement policy should
not be used as an instrument of social, regional or
industrial policy.
The international public procurement agreements
give every single country a guarantee that all other
countries open their markets, too. The winners of
such a liberalisation step are the taxpayers and the
firms benefiting from mass production. Is this con-
clusion still correct if some countries do not follow
the international procurement rules? In this case
the firms cannot fully benefit from economies of
scale and long-term innovations. The taxpayers,
however, still get a greater return for their contri-
butions.
A policy of retorsion would run counter to the offi-
cial Swiss position in international relations.
Switzerland, as is well known, is very reluctant to
accept new binding international agreements. But
once they are approved, it is willing to correctly
follow all obligations (Hart and Sauvé 1997). It
would be a bad example to discriminate foreign
competitors, but at the same time to demand open
access to foreign markets.
Competition between jurisdictions
In democratic societies and market-economies the
individual preferences matter. They differ not only
between individuals, but also between groups and
regions. The same holds for the production costs.
Should the local and cantonal governments there-
fore be autonomous in their procurement decisions
in order to take account of the local and regional
specialities? The answer is positive as far as it con-
cerns the specifications of procurement – as long as
they apply for all competitors. The procurement
rules, however, should not be set by the jurisdictions
individually. The danger is too great that the politi-
cians discriminate in favour of their own firms.
Our reasoning presupposes that there already exist
international public procurement agreements and
that they are accepted. If this were not yet the case
it would be reasonable to find out the best rules in
a kind of interregional or international competi-
tion. New solutions could be tested in a single
region. If they prove to lead to good results they
can be copied by other regions. If they do not, not
all regions would have to suffer from the losses.2
Social equity and political acceptance 
Countries which strongly favour efficiency often
show large social, sectoral and regional disparities.
Not all persons, industries and regions are capable
of efficient struggling under conditions of econom-
ic competition.There exists a conflict between effi-
ciency and equity. A certain degree of redistribu-
tion and/or regulation is necessary, be it for ethical
reasons or to make the market system politically
acceptable for the majority of the citizens. The
question is whether a protectionist procurement
policy is a good measure to generate acceptance. It
is not. There exist instruments associated with
lower efficiency costs.
Procurement agencies can privilege local firms
openly or covertly – openly by abandoning an open
tender, covertly by formulating requirements
which favour local firms and constrain market
access of non-local suppliers. Familiarity with the
language and the local circumstances, the knowl-
edge of technical and other standards, and the
compliance with regional or national rules fall in
this category of requirements.
The local collective labour agreements are an exam-
ple for such requirements. Must foreign competitors
sign them? The same question applies for the com-
pliance with industrial safety regulations. An argu-
ment in favour of enforcing domestic rules is that the
“exploitation” of labour via low wages must be pre-
vented,especially if otherwise local firms are thrown
out of the market.The counter-argument runs as fol-
lows: Procurement orders to foreign firms imply an
import of goods. Many other goods are imported,
however,without the foreign producers being forced
to sign Swiss collective labour agreements.3 
Compliance with collective labour agreements is
politically highly delicate: When considering the
2 In the early 1980s, in the United States a contract appeal agency
got new rules, The General Services Board of Contract Appeals
(GSBCA) got into competition with the older General Accounting
Office (GAO). The effect was that the GAO took the appealing
firms more seriously and checked the complaints more thoroughly
than before.The firms now enjoy a larger palette of legal remedies
(Kovacic 1995, 494ss.).
3 By the way, it can not be ignored that – like Switzerland fights
wage dumping – other countries resent the advantage of the low
interest rates for Swiss firms compared to companies from other
countries.different arguments, it is reasonable to demand
that foreign firms erecting buildings on the Swiss
territory comply with the same regulations as Swiss
firms do. However, this can not and should not be
required of suppliers of other goods and services.
There are minimum standards of corporate behav-
iour which have to be complied with by foreign
suppliers, too. The UN Global Compact is such a
set of principles to be adopted in public procure-
ment. They concern human rights, labour condi-
tions (the right to be a member of a union, the
interdiction of compulsory and child labour, the
prevention of discrimination with respect to race,
sex, religion, etc.) as well as environmental protec-
tion (compare: www.unglobalcompact.org). It can
be assumed that the majority of the Swiss popula-
tion would forbear from buying products which are
produced under unacceptable conditions in favour
of more expensive products.
Public Choice Analysis
Why have liberal procurement rules not been
implemented in the past when so many strong
points speak against privileging local firms? Public
choice theory gives an answer. It assumes that a
behaviour based on maximising individual utility is
not only characteristic of economic agents (pro-
ducers, consumers, workers, employers) but also of
politicians, bureaucrats, managers of public and
private enterprises and representatives of associa-
tions. As an analogy to maximising profits by pri-
vate firms it is spoken of the politicians (and par-
ties) maximising their votes, of the public servants
maximising the budget of their agencies, of the
public managers maximising their salaries and of
the lobbies maximising the rents of their pressure
groups (rent-seeking). That does not mean that
self-interest prevails at all time. In the following
the politico-economic approach (see e.g. Frey and
Kirchgässner 2002) will be briefly discussed and
applied to public procurement.
Principal-agent problems and bureaucratic
behaviour
According to the principal agent theory a basic
problem with contracts is information asymmetry.
The citizens are not able to issue concrete orders to
the elected members of parliament and govern-
ment, and they cannot exactly control whether
their orders are carried out exactly according to
their will.The same problem occurs in the relation
between government and administration.4
Whereas citizens and taxpayers have an interest in a
good cost-performance ratio, the awarding agencies
do not want to be exposed to the risk of contracting
with companies whose reputation they cannot judge
with the same accuracy as the local competitors.
Local companies are often believed to be more reli-
able.As a consequence, objective aspects (e.g. price
or quality) are not always the crucial criteria in the
selection of contractors. Procurement agencies are
usually risk averse;favouring local suppliers reduces
the risk of being accused later of having done a bad
job in the case of inadequate delivery or cost explo-
sion (Bohan and Redonnet 1997). Besides this so
called “buy-local”-instinct the awarding agencies do
not want to jeopardise a good relationship with the
local firms simply because of a one-time profit.Risk
aversion can also be explained with the presump-
tion that local companies left out are more likely to
take legal actions (Bohan and Redonnet 1997, 154).
On the other hand, it can be assumed that firms are
often reluctant to criticise the procurement agen-
cies. By doing so they would endanger future orders
(Arrowsmith 1996).
Rent-seeking and lobbyism
Even without alleging favouritism, the govern-
ment, the civil service and the procurement agen-
cies tend to equate their welfare with that of the
local firms.They feel bound to maintain local jobs,
to foster local technology or to ameliorate the
trade balance (Martin and Hartley 1997).
If regional firms can be confident of receiving all
orders of their jurisdiction this gives rise to the risk
of collusion.This is facilitated by the fact that most
of the local entrepreneurs and managers know
each others. They can either hamper the entrance
of new competitors or cooperate with them in view
of higher prices and a handsome producer surplus.
Until recently, the Swiss anti-trust law did not
allow to combate bidder cartels effectively. Such
cartels are typically “ad hoc cartels”, whereas anti-
trust regulation only applied to recurrence.
Meanwhile, a new law has been enacted. It will be
interesting to see whether it will have an effect on
public procurement, too.
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According to Olson (1965) and other scholars of
public choice it is much easier for the producers to
organise their interests in a powerful way than for
the consumers, the taxpayers or the citizens.This is
due to the fact that the number of suppliers of a
certain commodity is small and their interests are
relatively homogeneous. Not so for the consumers,
taxpayers and citizens. Their interests are hetero-
geneous. The single person is only marginally
affected by protectionist measures. There is little
incentive to form a countervailing power to the
suppliers’ interests.
Another problem, which does not directly affect
the bureaucracy and the interest groups, but rather
the democratic process as such, is the restriction of
re-election, which the parties and politicians are
subjected to. Particularly in small political jurisdic-
tions the entrepreneurs, their relatives and
employees account for a decisive part of the entire
voting public. Politicians and parties increase their
political power by privileging the local firms and
restricting the number of competitors in the gov-
ernment procurement process.
Conclusions for the Swiss Procurement Policy 
We know from economic theory that good rules
are essential to guarantee that the great number of
economic decisions taken independently leads to
an efficient use of scarce resources.This also holds
for public procurement. Here the following rules
are important (Mattoo 1996, Bohan and Redonnet
1997,Anechiarico and Jacobs 1995, Kovacic 1995):
• Public contracts have to be advertised interna-
tionally for bids exceeding a certain amount.
• The specifications have to be transparent.
• Discrimination of non-local suppliers is improper.
• The submission has to make clear all require-
ments potential suppliers have to meet.
• The suppliers must have some scope to intro-
duce new solutions.
• Discretion regarding sensitive information has
to be granted.
• The rules of procurement have to be enforced,
and loopholes must be avoided.
• Firms that want to take legal action must have
access to an impartial judge.
Our analysis of Swiss public procurement policy
has shown that efficiency and welfare losses can
turn up in two fields: in connection with the pro-
curement law and in connection with the procure-
ment practice, i.e. the application of the legal regu-
lations.
Procurement law
In Switzerland, the reasons for efficiency losses on
the legal level are mainly twofold:
(1) The great variety of rules and regulations low-
ers transparency and increases the information and
transaction costs.The correct application of the law
and its supervision become difficult. These prob-
lems regard much more the procurement agencies
than the firms.The awarding agencies have a tough
time negotiating their way through the jungle of
today’s regulatory diversity, conducting correct
submissions and preventing complaints against
their decisions. If they neglect the details they risk
to get into trouble when, afterwards, the losing
competitors oppose the final decision. The clearer
the submission prescriptions formulated by the
procurement agencies the easier the job for the
offering firms. These prefer uniform forms (paper
version) and input masks (Internet version).
(2) Legal rules and regulations cannot be formu-
lated explicitly enough to be applicable to each
case.This is especially true for orders which cannot
be standardised. Too much detail in rules and
guidelines may create rigidities and impede inno-
vations.
The revision of the procurement law should take
into account the following points:
• Threshold values: The observed variety of
threshold values is confusing both for procure-
ment agencies and firms. Threshold values
should reflect the fix cost associated with an
open tender which is approximately the same
across jurisdictions, but not different levels of
preferential treatment of local suppliers.
Harmonisation or minimal standards (i.e. maxi-
mal values) are desirable.
• Award procedures: The leeway for applying
open, selective and limited procedures should
be narrowly defined by law.
Submission and publication: The existing rules
already allow public submissions to be carried out
via Internet. On a long-term basis, a legal har-
monisation would facilitate E-Procurement, too.• Selection criteria: The freedom of the local and
cantonal jurisdictions to formulate specific con-
ditions regarding the qualification of the suppli-
ers and the services offered should be restricted.
They can easily be misused for protection pur-
poses.
• Contract conditions: The guiding principle of
imposed conditions must be equal treatment of
all suppliers, local and foreign.
Procurement procedures
In Switzerland, the main problem of public procure-
ment consists in the persistence of “old habits”. It is
a widely held view that local firms as employers and
taxpayers must be protected against foreign com-
petitors.Therefore,it is not surprising that the WTO-
rules are still not implemented as they should.This is
not so much a problem of the procurement law as
such, but rather of its application. Consequently, the
emphasis should be on a better implementation of
the national and cantonal procurement rules. This
requires a simplification of the procurement rules in
order to increase transparency and create adequate
surveillance mechanisms.
• Monitoring:The surveillance of the formal com-
pliance with the international and national pro-
curement rules and their interpretation in the
sense of competition,transparency,non-discrim-
ination and efficient use of resources must be
cost-effective and fast. It must also have a pre-
ventive effect.It is up to the lawyers to find ade-
quate ways and means to ensure the correct
application of the law. From the economic point
of view the creeping development of a big
bureaucracy must be avoided and innovations
must be encouraged.
Possible solutions are:
– formal judicial control, spot-checks by admin-
istrative and financial control agencies,the sur-
veillance by the monopoly commission etc.
– public announcement of “sinners”.
– disclosure of procurement facts (e.g. statis-
tics) so that third parties (media, researchers
etc.) can reveal grievances. The E-procure-
ment platform SIMAP could operate in the
same direction as it publishes not only the
invitations to bid but also the awards of bids.
– installation of an ombudsman.He or she could
collect notifications of infringement or
unequal treatment and try to create a counter-
balance to the interests of the local suppliers.
• Incentives to comply with efficiency: The effi-
cient behaviour must be made advantageous to
all parties involved in the procurement process.
Good results have been realised by general con-
tractors who, instead of government agencies,
are responsible for the submission and the eval-
uation of the tender. General contractors can
accumulate a specific knowledge and they are
less subject to political pressure. Last but not
least, blunders and misuse are penalised by
insolvency whereas government agencies do not
have to worry about their existence.
• Rights of appeal and complaint: Firms (and per-
sons) experiencing severe losses because of an
incorrect application of legal norms should have
the possibility to take legal action.The problem
is that the citizens and taxpayers as aggrieved
parties are not conscious of their losses and are
not authorised to complaint today.Furthermore,
even for firms the cost-benefit ratio of a formal
opposition is often negative. A simpler, faster
and less costly procedure is needed.
• Control of effectiveness and efficiency: As in
other policy areas, a systematic review of the
procurement activities on all levels of govern-
ment should be organised from time to time.
The results could serve as a background for fur-
ther improvement of the government procure-
ment policy and practice.
How much harmonisation?
At the moment, the federal government and the
cantons are preparing a reform of the public pro-
curement law. Four reform models are being eval-
uated (Biaggini 2003a):
• The revision of the existing intercantonal treaty
(Konkordat) does not go far enough. It leaves
too wide a scope to the cantons and to the local
jurisdictions for discrimination against foreign
competitors. And it takes too much time, mak-
ing the quick realisation of efficiency gains from
E-procurement unrealistic.
• A new federal law formulating guidelines
(Bundesrahmengesetz) for the subnational legis-
lation cannot solve the problems detected, either.
The deficiencies are not primarily due to lacking
legal norms but to their application in practice.
The opening of the markets and the equal treat-
ment of all competitors must be enforced.
• A partial harmonisation of the procurement pol-
icy in a new federal law would be the best solu-
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tion. It would allow the harmonisation of the
technical aspects necessary for E-procurement
and could enforce the factual opening of the
procurement markets without intervening too
much into the local autonomy apt to take into
consideration specific local circumstances.
• The complete harmonisation of the procurement
law via a new federal law is not necessary. Such
a solution would infringe the principle of sub-
sidiarity and provoke a strong opposition by the
cantons.
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